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Introduction 
Tantalus, son of Zeus and king of Sipylus, is a figure in the Greek mythology most famous 
for his exile from Olympus, home of the Greek gods, and his conviction to a perennial 
punishment and the eternal malevolence of the gods.  His torment, consisting of both 1
temptation and frustration, could be used as a metaphor for the Turkish position vis-à-vis 
Europe. As Meltem Ahıska (2003) asserts, in the Turkish struggle to join the European Union, 
Europe is considered to be both as an object and a source of frustration for Turkey’s 
international ambitions. Her perpetual efforts to achieve acceptance from the European 
community for the past sixty years is just the tip of an iceberg. Indeed, this is the history of a 
century-long relationship marked by stereotypes, vivid debates and discrepancies in 
perception. 
Grounding my approach in the semantic analysis of Beyza Ç. Tekin - who brilliantly assessed 
and examined the contemporary political discourse shaped by historical representations of the 
Turk in the French collective imaginary – this paper will demonstrate how Europe’s own 
perception of the Self influences its foreign policy and attitude towards its historical Others. 
By focusing on the representations of Turkey in the European social imaginary, the present 
research paper carefully analyzes the Self/Other dynamics within the context of the political 
debates on Turkey's quest for European Union (EU) membership. By providing a brief 
 According to the Greek mythology, Tantalus was punished by his father, Zeus, for tricking the gods and 1
offering them human flesh in his own banquet. Tantalus, therefore was thrown out of Olympus and after he died 
he was punished for eternity and condemned to spend his whole afterlife in the underworld, Tartara. His agony 
consisted in standing forever waist-deep in a pool of water, with a fruit tree full of ripe fruit right over him. Yet, 
no matter how hungry or thirsty he was, whenever he bent down to drink the water, it would all magically drain 
away, and whenever he reached up to pick some fruit, the branches would lift up out of his reach. Despite this 
perpetual suffering he was dead already and for this reason he could never die, travailing between temptation 
and frustration for eternity.
!3
introductory survey of a selection of political texts,  I will assess the importance of the role of 2
identity in the formation of political interests in the realm of International Relations.  
The research question in this paper is twofold: How has othering Turkey contributed to the 
construction of European Collective Identity? And: What does Europe’s ambiguous attitude 
towards Turkey tell us about the current status of the EU’s Self-perception? In order to 
demonstrate Turkey’s constitutive role in the formation of EU’s identity, the present inquiry 
will rely on a socio-historical analysis of the ways in which the Turkish Other has been 
represented in the EU political discourse. The theoretical framework adopted for this analysis 
belongs to the constructivist tradition. By openly acknowledging the importance of the 
situational context within which discourse is formed and transformed, the current research 
refers to the present and to the past as equally important elements of the Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) approach. This methodological choice relies on the conviction that the past 
is reflected in the present, shaping both our reality and the intricate and varied ways in which 
we understand it.  
Hence, the first part of the paper offers a historical and social contextualization of the EU-
Turkey relationship, exposing the dual image of ‘the Turks’, as friends or foes in the 
European social imaginary. The following chapters focus on the different European political 
attitudes towards the idea of Turkey's EU membership maintained during the negotiation 
process in the post-Helsinki period. Moreover, by critically scrutinizing political speeches 
and articles, the next chapter shows how the questions about Turkey’s Europeanness or non-
Europeanness are assessed through three different approaches: essentialist, functionalist and 
pragmatist. The fourth and final chapter of the research is devoted to the discussion of the 
The texts and speeches selected for this analysis are extracted from European political journals. Such sources 2
are already translated and adapted by B. Ç.Tekin (2010) in her manuscript: ”Representations and Othering in 
Discourse: The construction of Turkey in the EU context”.
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overall findings, arguing that political interests and attitudes are deeply influenced by the in-
group identity perception of the European Self and that the alterity attributed to Turkey, 
implicitly contributes to its construction. 
The discussions regarding Turkey’s possible accession to the EU have been intensively 
reviewed at a both international level and local level - taking over the Internet, the 
newspapers, even the national television and radio. Furthermore, despite the historical value 
of the Turkey-EU foreign policy affair, what makes the disconnection highly intriguing is its 
recently acquired identity dimension. This new angle of perception aroused a conspicuous 
interest among the most prominent leaders, who sought a new social engine for their political 
campaigns. Despite its geographical proximity to Europe, the constant political and socio-
economic interactions and its manifest enthusiasm to engage in the developing regional 
integration process with the Old continent, Turkey’s “Europeanness” has always been 
questioned and doubted by Western Europe. The idea of Turkey being included or even 
considered as an actual member of the European project is an ideological breaking point 
between the two, which for over a century has generated constant discussions and rekindled 
old irreconcilable rancor. 
From the very beginning of the European integration process in the 1950s, Turkey’s 
candidacy for membership has represented a highly complex and enigmatic matter, the 
contents of which have changed over time. The contours of these complexities have reflected 
the international political priorities at stake, as well as the various exigencies of powerful 
actors (Tekin, 2010). Since 1959, Turkey was one of the first countries to seek cooperation 
with the young European Economic Community (EEC). However, its request to join the ECC 
was merely addressed within the framework of an “association agreement” called the Ankara 
Agreement which was ratified in 1963. Such agreement aimed to establish a progressive 
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“Customs Union” between the European Economic Community and Turkey. It was designed 
with the intent to achieve a closer coordination of the respective economic policies and to 
“promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between 
the Contracting Parties”.  3
Despite this first partnership attempt, which accepted economic cooperation, the European 
Union has always been openly cautious and maintained an arm’s-length relationship with its 
Anatolian neighbor. In fact, it was not only until forty years later, at the Helsinki European 
Council in 1999, that Turkey finally saw the confirmation of its eligibility for EU 
membership. This event represented a turning point for the EU-Turkey relations since, for the 
first time, the debate concerning Turkish candidacy had moved to a more concrete realm. 
This olive branch extended by Europe seemed to signal a turning point. No longer would 
Europe’s perception of Turkey as “non-European” prevent Turkey from joining the European 
Community. However, Turkey’s sense of relief proved to be short lived as more obstacles 
soon appeared in its path towards integration. Indeed, severe critiques of the Turkish form of 
government, which did not meet Copenhagen’s political and economic criteria, again 
obstructed the formal recognition of Turkish candidacy for accession.  Questions were raised 4
about the country's level of civilization and compatibility with European values and 
principles of human rights, somewhat demonstrating that European public opinion still 
considered Turkey to be too foreign. Prospect for future negotiations faded away. 
 Preamble (Article 2 and 4b) of the Ankara Agreement Establishing an Association between the European 3
Economic Community and Turkey (Signed at Ankara, 1 September 1963). 
 According to the European Commission’s official website:”The accession criteria, or Copenhagen criteria 4
(after the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 which defined them), are the essential conditions all 
candidate countries must satisfy to become a member state. These are: (i) political criteria: stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
(i) economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market 
forces”- available at https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-
criteria_en.  
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The case of Turkey and its potential admission to the European system served as a catalyst 
which opened a public debate on the issue of what European identity implies and on which 
grounds it should be framed (Gole, 2005a)? Political talks about Turkey’s integration fostered 
an unprecedented wave of objections particularly strong among the French public, but also in 
the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, and eventually spread all around Europe. Questions 
such as “what is Europe?” and “who is European?” created discord as countries struggled to 
define what aspects of identity were essential to their regional project. The process of 
constructing a collective identity for Europe soon became a political agenda in and of itself 
which greatly influenced the future of the European Union as a whole.   
It is interesting to appraise the main reasons behind the European public’s rejection of 
Turkey’s membership, as they consist of three varied arguments which developed over time 
and included concerns about Turkey’s values, geographic distance, and its potential impact in 
steering the future of the European project.  During the 1970’s, the main differences that 
derailed Turkey’s accession focused on social and political matters. These issues included the 
poor legislation concerning human rights violations, the repression and consequent retraction 
on the promise of Kurdish citizenship, the increasing militarization of Turkish political life, 
the Greek-Cypriot perennial conflict, and the absurd denial of any Turkish involvement in the 
atrocious Armenian genocide. These stances all placed Turkey at a remarkable distance from 
the EU in terms of the political and humanitarian principles which many Europeans believed 
were at the heart of their nascent regional project (ibid).  
In 2002, however, the discussion shifted towards more geographical considerations. 
Questions, about where to draw the exact European borders and establish the topographical 
limitations of what was to be considered as part of the European community, emerged from 
the speeches of many European political elites. Many of these arguments pointed out the 
!7
“absurdity” of considering Turkey, even in exclusively geographical terms, a legitimate 
member of the European Union. According to the European far right, if Turkey was included 
someone could scrupulously argue “then why not Russia?” Moreover, expanding Europe’s 
Eastern border, would mean becoming direct neighbors with poor, unstable, and tumultuous 
countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria; a widely unpopular prospect amongst European 
citizens.(ibid).  
Besides geopolitical considerations, the eventual accession of Turkey into the EU also 
worried most democratic institutions, such as the European Parliament. The large number of 
Turkish citizens would mean that their votes would play a critical role in making substantial 
decisions about Europe’s future. This fear was determinative in the negotiations talks 
regarding Turkey’s EU membership. Europe’s concerns about the demographic qualities of 
Turkey were further aggravated by the predominant demographic of Muslims in the Turkish 
population. Turkey, indeed, is a country with a large Muslim majority, and the Christian 
majority states which constituted the EU shared concerns over the potential entrance of more 
than 50 million “Muslims” into their political, economic and social sphere. Moreover, 
looking at the direction that the developing integration process was taking, in becoming more 
and more intrusive in the state-members’ domestic affairs, the idea of such Islamic influence 
represented an additional uncomfortable change for most conservative European countries 
(ibid). 
Hence, inherent differences regarding cultural, religious and political views significantly 
framed the political and social environment within which the respective negotiations were 
advanced. Within this context, the othering of Turkey actively contributed to the process of 
defining the European Identity. In fact, the imminent threat associated with Turkey’s 
accession generated a desire to reinforce and protect the essence of Europeanness. The 
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urgency to clarify the cultural and civilizational boundaries of the EU is both the cause and 
the result of a century-old yet current, European identity crisis (ibid). 
Literature Review 
The Making of a Collective Identity. 
The concept of Collective Identity, intended as a shared sense of belonging within a specific social 
group, may be encompassed within a broader constructivist discourse concerning the creation of the 
social imaginary of a society (Al Raffie, 2013). According to Delanty and Rumford (2005), social 
discourses are shaped within a defined socio-cognitive structure in which people construct and adapt 
their social understanding and world-views by using different cultural imaginaries, frames, familiar 
symbols and codes. Societies, when trying to define their own world perspective and apprehend the 
composition of their own social fabric, tend to rely on shared repertoires of justification which are 
articulated in the context of particular “social imaginaries” (Castoriadis, 1987). Such collective 
imaginaries incorporate different norms, values, tools languages, modes and procedures - all peculiar 
elements of a well-defined and consolidated community - which not only keep a society together but 
shape and homologate their perceptions of reality (Castoriadis, 1997). As Castoriadis (1997:7) argues 
“there is a magma of social imaginary significations” which are continuously constructed and 
deconstructed while influencing our understanding of our social sphere. “Who are we as a 
collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are we? What do we want; what do we 
desire; what are we lacking? Society must define its ‘identity’, its articulation, the world, its relations 
to the world and to the objects it contains, its needs and its desires… The role of imaginary 
significations is to provide an answer to these questions.”  (Castoriadis 1987:  147). 
The act of collecting figures and meanings assists the society in creating and adjusting itself 
and contributes in defining its collocation in the world. Therefore, a society’s imaginary can 
be defined as a compendium of cultural and historical interpretations convenient for the 
reality of which it conceives and harmonized through its own cultural orientations 
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(Castoriadis, 1997). Such images are constantly transformed and informed by history or more 
correctly by our subjective reading of history. Therefore, social phenomena are framed and 
perceived culturally and historically under the lens of society’s imaginary, which contributes 
in the formation of a shared but distinct collective identity (Tucker, 2005). 
As William E. Connolly (1991) asses in his analysis on identity politics, identity only exists 
in relation to the “other”, which means that when we define the identity of a specific group, 
we also identify the differences which separate it from the surrounding sphere. Searching for 
identity entails differentiating oneself from what is not, therefore, when dealing with identity 
politics we are implicitly inclined to create differences (Benhabib, 1996). In the relational 
realm, these differences are converted into otherness and serve as a tool to establish and 
secure identity based self-certainties (Connolly, 1991). To this extent, Durkheim's theory on 
the social division of labour explains that the delineation of an in-group requires the 
identification of the relevant out-group(s). Therefore, the Self/Other dichotomy is essential in 
the creation of collective identity, recognized as such by both the individual as well as the 
collective (Neumann, 1999). 
In the context of international relations, the cardinal nexus between the Self and the Other is 
anchored to sociological and historical perceptions that are constructed through time. The 
inevitable link to social-historical contexts is reflected in modern international relations and 
explains the formations of multiple Others in opposition to what is considered as belonging to 
the Self. Therefore, when we study international politics, we are essentially studying the 
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politics of making the Other (Shapiro, 1988) or as Guillaume (2002: para. 22) suggests: the 
politics of alterity.  5
Moreover, Todorov (1982/1999) in his manuscript, “The conquest of America. The Question 
of the other”, by studying of the sociological aspect of the discovery of the American 
continent, demonstrates that a multilayered analysis is necessary when trying to asses the 
relationship between the Self and the Other. He argues that the interpersonal contact between 
different social groups represents a moment of exchange where it is possible to confront the 
imaginary, where each collective can marry their perceptions of the other with reality. This 
represents a precious source of knowledge and serves both the Self and the Other in 
discovering and deepening their mutual understanding of one another and consequently 
themselves. Furthermore, in his analysis, Todorov (1999) introduces a multilevel approach 
through which it is possible to identify three different aspects in the approach of the Other. 
The first one is known as the axiological level. Taken from Greek “axia” meaning value, this 
level scrutinizes the inherent worth of the subject and contemplates the hypothesis of whether 
the Other is considered to be superior or inferior in relation to the Self. It supposes that the 
first step towards a recognition of the Other consists in an evaluation of its characteristics in 
order to decide whether it is better or worse than the Self (Hansen, 1998). The second, the 
praxeological level, is established on more factual grounds (“praxis”) and concerns the 
degree of separation perceived of between the Self and the Other.. This level varies 
depending on the outcomes of the previous evaluation made at the axiological level. 
 The politics of alterity is a concept significantly developed by Xavier Guillaume in his work, “Foreign Policy 5
and the Politics of Alterity: A Dialogical Understanding of International Relations” (2002). As the author claims 
such notion was constructed within the meta- theoretical framework of of constructivism in the field of 
International Relations. According to his dialogical understanding, “the social world is constructed through an 
interweaving of mutually-responsive discourses between several agents” (p.12). In order to apprehend agents' 
identities, the politics of alterity provides an interpretative tool, thank to which - “by discerning their 
expressivity, contextuality and relationality” (p.15) - is possible to analysis the multifaceted process of identity 
formation within the discipline of International Relations.
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Therefore, the decision regarding the inherent value of the Other helps establish its proximity 
with the Self. How should “We” approach the Other? What kind of attitude should “We” 
maintain when confronting “Them”?  Depending on the evaluation made at the axiological 
level the corresponding praxeological actions may suggest either neutrality, indifference, 
submission or assimilation toward the Other (Stjerno, 2001). At this point, the Self may 
decide to either embrace the Other’s value or instead impose his own values upon him. In 
other words, the Self can choose if he needs to assimilate or domesticate the Other or even to 
consider it as an extension of the Self  (Tekin, 2010). At the third and last stage, known as the 
epistemic level, the attention shifts toward the actual degree of knowledge that the Self has 
on the Other. Do “We” know “Them”? Are we knowledgeable enough of the “Other’s” 
identity? 
In the reality and especially in the realm of international relations, there is a customized 
tendency by the public, usually manipulated by their own political elites, to demonize the 
Other in the attempt to construct and reassure the identity of the Self. In this regard, the 
twentieth-century philosopher, Jeffrey T. Nealon (1998), provides an interesting analyzes 
about the many ways society deals with the ethical understanding of a different community. 
In his work, “Alterity Politics: Ethics and Performative Subjectivity”, he argues that ethics 
require action and a positively constructed attitude towards different identities. While passive 
resentment, besides being unproductive, also tends to exasperate our refusal or inability to 
understand difference. In fact, as Connolly (1991) points out, an extremely negative 
perception of “others” is a “temptation rather than a necessity” (p.8).  
Moreover, the perception of the Other, as well as the Self, is not static but continuously 
informed and transformed over time. Therefore, especially in the field of international 
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relations, an old enemy may turn into a precious ally and vice versa, accordingly to the 
relevant existing circumstances and historical developments (Wendt, 1994).  
The Role of Collective Memory in the Perception of the Self 
and the Other. 
There is an extensive corpus of literature  which illustrates how the perception of the Turkish 
Other was perceived of within European political discourse since the early days of the 
Ottoman Empire. How this dynamic of perception and othering has developed over centuries 
has received significant political and historical attention (Tekin, 2010). By constantly trying 
to differentiate themselves respective to the Turkish and European other, their own identities 
were constructed accordingly. Therefore, as Robert Schwoebel (1972) asserts, the impression 
of the Other has been a determining element in the formation of the collective identity of both 
groups. Consequently the evolution of the imaginary of European society regarding the Turks 
functions as a mirror in defining and shaping so called “Europeanness”.  
The Ottoman Empire has long occupied a central role in the European political order. Due to 
its non-Christian tradition, it has always been portrayed as an antagonist in the traditional 
metaphors, representations, images, and memories of the Europeans. Indeed, the Ottoman 
Empire was commonly used by the Europeans as the worst example of civilization (see 
Landweber, 2001; Kaiser, 2000). The use of this kind of language to identify Turkish society 
derives from past experiences and historic imaginaries which are imprinted in the collective 
memory of Europe. Collective memory “preserves the store of knowledge from which a 
group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity”(Olick, 2011:213). Therefore, 
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memory in this instance has an identificatory function which determines the way in which a 
society perceives of itself - “we are this”- or its opposition (Mol, 1976). The importance of 
such a concept and its influence on social imagination can be appreciated in Halbwach’s 
(1992) studies. According to his analysis, collective memory is the result of a popular 
reconstruction and rearrangement of the past within the collective framework of a specific 
society, whose ways of representation are highly affected by the present social milieu. 
Collective memory is always informed and relates its judgment of the past according to 
contemporary circumstances. Therefore, the past within the memory of a collectivity “is not 
preserved, but is reconstructed on the basis of the present” (Halbwach 1992:40). 
Consequently history is remodeled and integrated with individual memories, which provide 
the collective memory with particular subjective elements that reality does not necessarily 
boast (ibis). De facto, the collective memory of a society significantly shapes its identity and 
determines the way it is seen by the surrounding social groups and by its own components. 
Hence, the way the Self/Other relationship is represented in the memory of a collectivity 
explains much about a society’s relation with history and its attitude in dealing with its past 
(Assmann, 1995). 
Based on the assumptions stated above and acknowledging the selectivity with which 
memory operates, Halbwach (1992) concludes, each society has different collective 
memories, which affect their social imaginary and direct their behavior in the interactive 
sphere of international relations (Assmann, 1995). Therefore, it is cinch to understand the 
origins and the reasons behind the political discourses that revolve around Turkey’s possible 
entry into the European Union. Through their selective and “myopic” reading of history, each 
argumentation is built upon different memories and images which are reflected on the 
political debates affiliated with Turkey’s potential annexation (Servantie, 2003:183).  
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Europe’s Social Imaginary of Turkey: a Historical Overview. 
This study, conducted by using a historically-grounded approach, aims to provide an analysis 
of how the Self/Other, intended as socio-political phenomenon which has always 
characterized the relationship between Turkey and the European Union, has developed since 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. However, the historical dimension provided here is 
not to be considered as the focal point of this research, but rather a necessary tool in order to 
offer the appropriate background information on Turkey’s EU membership debate. Stating 
Chilton’s (2002) accurate reflections, in order to fully understand the nature of the discourse, 
it is fundamental to understand the prime purpose and original causes of its very existence. To 
accomplish this, a historical analysis and a more profound knowledge of the socio-political 
context is required (pp. 154-155).  
As it was mentioned in the previous section, images and representations of the social 
imaginary of a specific collectivity are informed and shaped by the society’s understanding 
and subjective interpretation of history. Moreover, historical imaginaries highly reflect 
people’s perception of the present which is often embedded in today’s political discourse. 
(Tekin, 2010). The evolution of the otherness, affiliated to Turkish society within European 
historical imagination, needs to be examined in retrospect. When trying to analyze the 
historical heritage at the heart of the political discourses orchestrating the debates about 
Turkey’s annexation to the EU, questions about the construction and the development of such 
rhetoric need to be advanced. The historical image of the Turks and its designation as 
Europe’s inferable Other, has its roots in the collective memory of the European society 
which, according  to Spinelli’s (2005:491) words concerning historical scrutiny, has now 
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become a “never stifling awareness tool”. When considering the historical legacy of the old 
Eurasian society, issues regarding religious and cultural differences between the two 
collectives and their linked ethical concerns, result in the fluid nature of their relationships 
and their continuous transformation throughout history. The constant alteration of the Self/
Other nexus can be compared to a “pendulum in motion”, shifting from negative to positive 
and vice versa, depending on the existing international political climate (Tekin, 2010:27). In 
order to assess the multiple images associated to each party - correlated to their political 
character, religion, culture and civilization level s - a historical landmark needs to be 
established. For the purpose of the present analysis and for its practicality, the starting point 
in studying this century-long affair will coincide with the decadence of the Ottoman Empire, 
also known as the Tanzimat period of the nineteenth century.  
Throughout the Medieval age, the image of the Turk was principally conceived of as the main 
opponent of Christian Europe. In fact, the contacts and exchanges with the Turkish society 
were mostly related to economic interests and trade opportunities (Göçek, 1987). Moreover, 
the, already limited in scope, confrontations were obscured by the frequent military clashes 
during the age of the Crusades (Daniel 1997). The Turkish Other was therefore primarily 
perceived of in reference to Islam and thus Turks were consequently seen as the infidel 
Muslims, “the cruel and blasphemous aggressor of Christendom, the infidel occupier of the 
holy sites” (Tekin, 2010:28). In sum, Turkey during  the Ottoman Empire was considered the 
emblem of ignorance, blasphemy, violence and religious recklessness (Kaiser, 20000: 8). 
Following the dissolution of the Turkish Empire,the constitution of the Turkish Republic in 
the Anatolian heartland, and the abolition of the Ottoman monarchy, more realistic and 
neutral opinions about the Turks and their society were developed and a clear a shift in 
Europeans attitudes could be observed  (Howard, 2016). De facto, with the turning of the 
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nineteenth century the main aspects of confrontation were rather societal and political than 
religious. The principal differences between the two civilization were embedded in debates 
contemplating the form of government, moral values and enlightenment ideals such as 
freedom, scientific progress and fundamental rights status. Nevertheless, the European social 
imagination regarding Turkish society was still defined within “the specter of Oriental 
despotism” (Grosrichard, 1998:3). Oriental despotism was used to describe a political system 
of absolute domination where the despot was the only authority in power and where the 
subjects were considered his servants and property. Within this political frame, individual 
rights and the idea of legitimacy of power, were still rejected if not completely ignored (ibid). 
This kind of rhetoric predominated the public debates then in Europe when referring to the 
Turkish society. This is also one of the main reasons behind the shared idea of civic 
backwardness of the Orient (Kaiser, 2000).To this extent, the Turkish otherness was used as 
an evaluation parameter for European governments to measure their own level of civilization. 
Hence, the Turkish Other served as an antipode model to promote the European Self.  
With the turn of the nineteenth century, a clear shift in Europe’s attitude towards Turkey 
followed. The century-old image of the Turks’ monstrosity, considered as the incarnation of 
the devil, has faded almost completely after the Empire’s dismemberment. The fear 
associated with the Ottomans during the Middle Age had been converted into a an image of 
absolute degradation and inexorable decline. What had remained from the lost Empire served 
as a reassurance of superiority for Europe which at this point looked at Turkey as “L’homme 
malade de l’Europe” - the sick man of Europe (Anamur 1986: 503; Moussa, 2006). 
However, with the development of transportation facilities and the consequent intensification 
of economic exchanges, an unprecedented predilection and curiosity towards the mysterious 
Orient emerged among European travellers. With the inauguration of the Orient Express  - 
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which soon became an intercultural bridge that connected the Occident capital of Paris with 
the old town of Costantinopoli, the indisputable cloister of the Anatolian civilization -  a vivid 
interest flourished among enthusiastic travellers and researchers (Dumont, 1982). This bizarre 
kinship and attraction for the Orient contributed in the cultivation of oriental studies and the 
collection of first hand memoirs which soon became part of a new literary stream known as 
Orientalism (Ulağlı, 1998). As Said (1979:170) brilliantly put it: “the Orient of memories, 
suggestive ruins, forgotten secrets, hidden correspondences and an almost virtuosic science of 
being” suddenly became a source of inspiration for European intellectuals. Additionally, the 
rising interest perceived in most European countries, soon materialized into a real and active 
involvement in “la question d’Orient” - the Eastern question - referring to the vacillating 
destiny of the old Ottoman territories (Ulağlı, 1998:41). Orientalism at that time became a 
mean for European intellectuals to familiarize and acquire knowledge about the Orient 
without having ever stepped on those lands. The “sick man of Europe” was now considered a 
valuable cultural and anthropological resource. 
Starting in the 1830s, a strong turkophile movement emerged in most European metropolis, 
promoting the idea of  “the good Muslim” (ibid). An extraordinary sentiment of friendliness 
was disseminated all across the old continent by the late nineteenth century, which certainly 
challenged the Western presumption of unquestionable superiority. According to the writings 
of voyager-philosophers of that period, Turkey or more in general Islam was considered the 
“mythical antipodes of an Occident, whose modernity seemed too banal” (Dumont 1982: 
350). Thus apparently, towards the end of the nineteenth century until the outbreak of the 
First World War, the image of the Turk became rather appealing if not amicable.  
As we can see, Europe’s image of Turkey was fluctuant and ambiguous: 
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“The Turk is noble and good; he has the sense of justice and loyalty; one will never 
see him ill-treat animals, and treason is odious to him. But he resents injustices, 
injuries, and humiliations, and he never fails to take revenge on the first 
occasion”  (Guides d’Isambert and Joanne 1902, cited in Dumont 1982). 
On the one hand, Turkey has long been described as an agglomerate of cruelty, intolerance 
and violence, underlying its civilizational backwardness and genetical inferiority. Islam was 
considered opposed to Christianity and malefic by nature, while approving gender 
discrimination, slavery and ignorance  (Todorov 1989:  400).  On the other hand, such 
animosity and sentiment of  repudiation and the extreme degree of barbarity attributed to 
Turkish society, and more broadly to the Islamic cult, was radically opposed by sympathetic 
movements which, instead, appraised the Oriental culture and charm while discarding the 
prosaicism and hypocrisy of the Occident as well as the self-proclaimed supremacy of 
Christian dogma.  
Ultimately though, the negative stereotypes attached to the Turkish Other in past centuries 
continued to dominate the main political debates and to affect the public of most European 
countries in the following twentieth century. We can see this especially in the shared 
resentment and frustration generated by the dismemberment of once great European Empires 
and their consequent transition into new and less grandiose modes of political arrangement. 
The widespread loss of former colonies and territories is widely considered to be a 
contributing factor in the dissemination of crude religious stereotypes that pervaded European 
contact with the otherized Turk. Political instability and identity driven anxiety amplified old 
colonialist attitudes which resulted in the adoption of destructive discourses, according to 
which each race should live within the administrative frame of its own old faith (Driault 
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1917:400). Self-determination discourses deformed and incorporated into nationalist 
propaganda spread across Europe. The situation progressively degenerated to the point that 
Europe’s post colonialists perception were now incapable of imagining the others into her 
own vision:  
We hear that other Asian races such as the Hungarians adopted European manners and 
deserve to enter into the European family. But it is because since the Middle Ages 
they were Christian, and that Christianity was the only combining force between 
different people […]. The Turks on the contrary remained Muslim […] they only 
accentuated their Asian character, and they look more alien and more barbarian than 
ever. […] The Turk misled Europe on his true feelings; because he has an innate, 
incurable disloyalty […]. In fact, Turks cannot be absorbed in European civilization 
since they are not capable of being assimilated […].  (Driault 1917: 407–409) 
Such severe considerations towards the Turkish Other were partially abandoned and 
gradually vanished in light of the reforms undertaken during the 1920s and the birth of the 
Turkish Republic. In fact, the abolition of the Sultanate and the following institution of a 
parliament within the new Ankara-based multiparty democracy regime - which interrupted 
623 years of monarchical Ottoman rule - led to the international recognition of Turkey’s 
sovereignty. The new image of Turkey as a modern international power gradually 
approaching Western universal values of freedom and democracy provoked a structural 
fracture in the European social imaginary. The “nouvelle Turquie” was seen now with 
sympathy as it had gained its seat in the international rank among the other Occidental 
powers (Duhamel, 1954). 
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A Fragile European Identity and an Unstable Union: Socio-
Political Context of EU Integration. 
In the 1950s, following the atrocities of the Second World War, the creation of a European 
Community was seen as the only feasible solution able to break the vicious circle of war and 
destruction which had devastated the Old Continent (Anon, 2017). The creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 represented a pivotal moment in the European 
federal history. The European Economic Community and  European Atomic Energy 
Community followed right after. By the 1960s a club of six - Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany - came together constituting the basis of the 
first ever European political integration project. Such ambitious and pioneering vision was 
not free of contingencies and the first doubts about the direction that this regional 
organization was taking started to become increasingly louder. Moreover, the subsequent 
enlargements of the European community further aggravated an already complex situation 
which eventually culminated in its first identity crisis.  
The political instability dominating the European landscape reflected a deeper fracture within 
the newly formed regional body. Long-ignored identity dilemmas were finally reaching the 
surface while enhancing the perennial struggle of the member states in finding their place 
within a growing EU ( Bell, 2002:228). The profound transformation that the European 
public had to confront, such as the industrial revolution of their societies as well as other 
extraordinary phenomena, including illegal mass migration, caused the re-approachment of 
complacent right wing parties. Conservative movements, disseminating all over Europe, 
started to gain significant political and electoral power which allowed them to bring cultural 
essentialist ideals of racialized nationalism from the old colonialist traditions back to the table 
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(Mayer and Sineau, 2002). Therefore, the collective sentiment of fatigue which pervaded 
most European members during the integration process, resulted in the “lepénisation des 
esprits” of the European project which promoted a singular facet of nationalism rooted in the 
pan-European identity. The immigration challenge and the failure of the Union to 
successfully cope with a new surge of diversity provided a favorable environment for the 
outset of a new hostile political attitude. The extreme anti-muslim prejudices that were 
spawned from this dynamic provided the antecedent for what is today commonly termed as 
Islamophobia. (Wieviorka, 2002). 
Methods and Approaches  
The approach used in this research in order to study the identity formation of Europe and its 
perception of the Turkish Other, in the context of Turkey’s accession to the EU, is primarily a 
constructivist one. The present study moves from the belief that identity formation and their 
understanding are significantly influenced by the social constructions and reconstructions of 
the Other suggested by the political discourses. Therefore, the chosen methodological 
framework derives from Foucault's theoretical approach of Critical Discourse Analysis. Such 
choice, concerning the analytical methodology of this study, belongs to the constructivist 
tradition and aims to study the way social representations construct reality. In other terms 
how discourse create meanings (Hall, 1997). The Critical Discourse Analysis “examines not 
only how language and representation produce meaning, but how the knowledge which a 
particular discourse produces connects with power” (Hall 1997: 6). According to Foucault’s 
works, “L’Archéologie du Savoir”  (1969) and “L’Ordre du Discours” (1971), discourse, 
intended as specific structure of language, and the conceptual framework within it is 
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developed, can manipulate the ultimate meaning and consequently the social understanding 
of a particular topic (Crawshaw & Tusting 2000: 25). An equivalent conclusion can be 
extracted from Stuart Hall’s definition of discourse, according to which a discourse is 
intended as a mode of representing a certain topic in a deliberately planned manner which 
does not only shapes its  content and interpretation but, he adds, also “limits the ways in 
which the topic can be constructed” (Hall 1992: 291). Therefore this approach of analysis 
takes into consideration the role of power in representing, modeling and deconstructing 
knowledge within discourse. Similarly, the construction of identities within the collective 
imaginary are subjective to the politics of discourse often manipulated and monopolized by 
questions of power (Tekin, 2010). 
Moreover, the Critical Discourse Analysis considers the ways in which language is deployed 
when involved in “ social relations with power and domination, and ideology” (Fairclough 
2001: 229). In modern democracies language is often been used as a tool through which 
power is exercise. Political scientists, such as Fairclough (1992) and Wodak (1996), consider 
language as a form of social practice, critical to the configuration of the political process. 
Therefore, it is essential for the scholar community to be able to recognize and decode the 
subtle use of language, incorporated in political discourses which implicitly suggest social 
destructive ideologies such as nationalism and racism (Crawshaw & Tusting 2000: 27).  
Besides, the political relevance, this method is largely used in the historical analysis of 
representations, identities and subjectivities. The discourse-historical approach emphasizes 
the importance of the temporal context within which discourse is constructed, introducing a 
socio-cognitive aspect in its analysis (Reisigl & Wodak 2001). The historical 
contextualization of discursive construction of collective identities represents a common 
practice in contemporary scholarship and provides the analysis with a solid and pertinent 
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documentation (de Cillia et al. 1999). By predominantly addressing the historical dimension 
of discourses, this historical-oriented approach “integrates all available information on the 
historical background and the original sources in which discursive events are embedded” (de 
Cillia et al. 1999: 156). 
The source materials used for the present research include both primary and secondary 
resources. For the purpose of this study will be reviewed theories and approaches mostly by 
scholars, integrated with texts and talks by European politicians. In order to understand the 
evolution of the narrative’s formation regarding the Turk and the Turkish identity,  historical 
texts  will be contemplated as well as 20th century Orientalists writings will be scrutinized in 
the attempt to contextualize the dissolution of the century-old Ottoman empire and the 
emergence of the modern Republic of Turkey. Moreover, newspaper articles and online 
commentaries regarding significant debates revolving on Turkey’s EU membership odyssey, 
which prevailed in the international arena during the relevant timeframe, have been selected. 
The three political momentums that scan the present analysis are, firstly, the Helsinki Summit 
in 1999 at which for the first time negotiations about Turkey’s full- EU membership were 
officially discussed. Secondly, the beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey by the 
European Council, which took place in 2005. Lastly, the suspension of such negotiations by 
the European Parliament, in 2016, over human rights and rule of law violations. 
  
Discourse Analysis 
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European Public Attitudes in the Debate of Turkey’s EU 
Accession.  
Considering the social and political context in which Turkey’s quest for EU membership was 
advanced, the European debate on Turkey’s EU candidacy could not have been refined in a 
positive and propositive manner. On the contrary, the initial reluctance and shared skepticism 
of the European community towards its Muslim neighbours, mirrored an already grave and 
turbulent horizon. Understanding the political climate persisting during Turkey’s EU 
annexation quest, is crucial in order to comprehend the key components of the discursive 
framework within which the corresponding negotiations took place. For this reason, the 
present section will examine the evolution of Turkey’s perception in Europe and the latter’s 
attitude towards the idea of an eventual unification of the two collectivities, in retrospect. 
Such analysis will consider the events occurred starting from 1999, when the Helsinki 
European Council decided on the potential candidacy of Turkey as a full member of the 
European Union, confirming its eligibility until 2016, when the European Parliament voted to 
suspend the negotiations over social and political concerns.  6
As it became clear from the previous historical analysis, the relationship between Turkey and 
the EU has often been of a contentious nature one. Such dispute is reflective of the old 
controversies linked to the century-old Occident/Orient schism and which revived in the 
contemporary political debates regarding Turkey’s international  role. Turkey formalized its 
application for EU membership in 1987 yet informal economical strings with the Union were 
already established since 1959. Since the very early stages of the European integration 
 In fact in March 2016, "the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan says freedom and democracy have 'no 6
value' in Turkey amid arrests and military crackdown". The Independent. 18 March 2016.
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process, EU’s position regarding its ties with Turkey had always depended on general 
security concerns. Indeed, the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European 
Economic Community, signed in 1963, was nothing more than a strategic move to ensure 
national security against one of Europe’s greatest others, the Soviet Union (Soutou, 2004). 
The evident ambiguity of Europe’s behaviour in dealing with Turkey’s aspirations can be 
explained if we take into account the ways in which the EU conceived itself and the different 
implications that such interpretations implied. As Soutou (2004:923) argued, as long as the 
European Union is understood as a merely intergovernmental institution which main focus is 
the cooperation between states, then Turkey is encompassed in such system. Yet if the idea of 
Europe is constructed under more civilizational-cultural terms and its ties rely on the 
common European historical and cultural heritage, then Turkey’s annexation is less likely to 
be accepted. The duality of Europe’s official position towards Turkey’s integration was 
clearly expressed by the then prime minister of France, Jean-Pierre Raffarin (2004), who, at 
the question regarding French attitudes towards Turkey’s aspirations, commented: 
“We can summarize the story as follows: the response of France, was rather “no” 
when we thought of European construction, and rather “yes” when we thought of the 
balances of the world.” (Raffarin, A ssemblée Nationale, 14/10/2004). 
As the European integration process was advancing and the internal disputes regarding 
political sovereignty of the state members were progressively settled, the public opinion on 
the Turkish matter became more tolerable and gradually moved towards a more favorable 
inclination. Such positive shift in the European attitude started in the late 1980s and persisted 
until the end of the twentieth century, when the official confirmation of Turkey’s eligibility 
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for EU membership was finally delivered, in occasion of the Helsinki Summit in December 
1999 (Semo & Virot, Libération,  16/12/2004).  
The Helsinki Summit was supposed to represent the beginning of a new chapter for the 
historically troubled relationship between Turkey and the EU. Instead, the post-Helsinki 
period witnessed a radical change particularly manifest in the speeches of many European 
political elites. A more hostile tone was used to discuss Turkey’s candidacy (ibid). As Semo 
and Virot (Libération, 16/12/2004) put it, the European politics experienced “a switch from a 
well-entrenched turcophilia to some kind of a turcophobia ”. With the turn of the following 
century, the European’s reticence became even more explicit, especially among sovereignists 
and extreme right movements which took the debates to a public level involving mass media 
and social digital platforms.  
“Europe died in Helsinki, while deciding to allow Turkey to enter the European 
Union” (de Villiers quoted in L e Figaro , 14/01/2000).  
The Helsinki Summit has therefore created a schism in Europe’s public opinion between 
those who still believed in the legitimacy of Turkey to become part of the European family 
and those, instead, who were more reluctant and skeptical about the real motives hidden 
behind Turkey’s quest and the possible consequences of such enlarged Union. 
By the following European Summit, which took place in the Danish capital in December 
2002, turcosceptical sentiments had spread amongst most state members, increasingly 
affecting the opinion of their citizens.  This time, however, the main discourse behind the 
collective negative attitudes against Turkey’s vocacy for membership, introduced a new 
dimension of the issue, altering and expanding the nature of the discussion (Lequesne, 2006). 
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Initially the discourse of Europe’s parliamentary right was mostly entrenched in culturalist-
essentialist grounds, stressing the lack of common civilizational heritage and the inherent 
irreconcilable differences which divided the two factions (Nikolaidis, 2003:61).  Such 
position was endorsed and exalted also by the Church which emphasized the importance of 
the century-old Christian tradition in Europe. In fact, according to the Vatican’s view then, 
Turkey’s entrance to the EU would put the European culture at risk. Cardinal Ratzinger, who 
presided over the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith from 2005 to 2013, argued that 
Europe is united by its "culture which gives it a common identity. [...] and the roots which 
formed this continent are those of Christianity." (Catholic News, 2005).  Moreover, the 7
religious question was further aggravated by Giscard d’Estaing  comments -  “the most 8
Roman Catholic of all French Presidents of the Fifth Republic” (DNA,  01/12/2002) -  who 
openly opposed Turkey’s annexation on religious grounds, affirming that there is no place for 
Islam in the European Community and suggesting the existence of a “hidden agenda” behind 
the Islamists government of Turkey (Chenal, 2004:16) 
Eventually, the opposition’s attention shifted from identity and religion issues towards more 
functional and pragmatical considerations. Geographical incongruities between the two 
regions and concerns about the practical consequences - that the admission of a highly 
populated country, such as Turkey, into the Europe’s political system would have - on the 
concrete future of the European project, took the discussion into a different level and 
dimension (Lequesne 2006: 30). Moreover, impending questions about the real capacity of 
Turkey to eventually meet the democratic political standards of the Union and to actually 
 Alain Duhamel calls Valéry Giscard d’Estaing “The most Roman Catholic of all French Presidents of the Fifth 7
Republic” (DNA, 01/12/2002) .
  Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is a French centrist politician who served as President of the French Republic from 8
1974 until 1981.
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accomplish the required social reforms, especially regarding human rights and the rule of law 
in the near future still remained (ibid).  
“Turkey is not Europe. It is not Europe neither by its culture, neither by its territory, 
nor by its history […]. June 13 say no to Turkey in Europe and say no to a Europe of 
immigration”. (Akagül & Vaner, 2005:  53–54). 
The Far-right xenophobic arguments combined with the proliferation of eurosceptical 
movements within the EU, significantly shaped Europe’s relationship with Turkey and the 
future of the negotiation process, formally initiated in 2004 (Akagül & Vaner, 2005). By 
instrumentalizing the fragilities of the nascent European political system - further challenged 
by contemporary global issues, such as terrorism and the ongoing immigration crisis, 
prominent political leaders managed to popularize a more “closed, racist, and xenophobic 
conception of the nation” and therefore promote their own view on how the European Union 
should advance (Wieviorka 2002: 134).  
Emblematic is the case of France’s opposition - where turcosceptisism goes hand in hand 
with nationalism and extreme right parties. In fact, in the realm of the French Islamophobia , 9
Muslims became the much needed scapegoat for the shared social and economic malaise that 
has troubled France as well as other European countries in the past couple decades. The rise 
and manifestation of this post-modern form of cultural-oriented racism, defined by Etienne 
Balibar (1991:21) as “racism without race”, served as an auto-referential dimension. To put it 
into a more cultural-essentialist perspective, contemporary racialized nationalism could be 
 Intended as a particular form of racism, particularly common in the Western societies, and it depends not only 9
on physical differences of the victims but also in their cultural peculiarities (Wieviorka 2002: 139).
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considered as a way through which the European Self attempts to construct its identity with 
reference to the Muslim Other (Silverman, 1999). This explains the obsession of France, 
along with other EU members, with the preservation and according to some extremists views, 
the non-contamination of their  national values as well as their European civilizational values 
considered as personal of the Self (Tekin, 2010). 
Analysis of the European Social Imaginary of Turkey: 
Essentialists, Functionalists and Pragmatists Argumentations. 
Therefore, when identifying and then analysing the main topics, dominating the public and 
political debate over Turkey’s EU prospects, three distinct yet often overlapping 
argumentation  clusters emerge. Such tripartite division, introduced by Nicolaidis (2003:59), 
rests on the different nature of the issue on stake that each discourse group seek to tackle.  
Essentialist Argumentations. 
The first one considers the inherent differences between Turkey and Europe on merely 
essentialists grounds. As it was mentioned in the previous sections, culturalists-essentialists 
arguments, present especially in most opposition’s political campaigns, categorically denied 
Turkey’s Europeanness, sustaining that such differences, due to their very nature, are 
impossible to overcome or even try to ignore. Within such argumentations, is possible to 
distinguish two main streams: one regarding geographical considerations and the other 
primarily focusing on cultural and historical discrepancies. These “congenital” and therefore 
irreversible divergences, respond to the imminent need of Europe to establish its own 
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boundaries, in order to define and secure its identity (Torréblanca 2005). Therefore, 
essentialist discourses and questions regarding Turkey’s actual Europeanness serve to such 
purpose. 
This is not a European country by geography, it is Asia, through Asia Minor. It is not a 
European country by history, it is the Ottoman Empire that destroyed Byzantium and 
sought to subjugate Europe. […] And especially it is not a European country by 
religion since it is a Muslim country. Because, let us say so clearly, Islam is not 
European. (Bruno Mégret, MNR, personal website, 24/05/2005a). 
The discussion regarding the physical proximity or distance of Turkey can be classified as the 
less politicized and problematic one. In fact, Turkey’s apparent belonging to the geographical 
perimeter of Europe can be articulated under the scientific objectivity of the “science” of 
geography (Tekin, 2010). Such assertion has been speculatively used by both political sides 
to persuade the public’s opinion. From the opposition’s side, the deployment of such 
stratagem became clear during the Copenhagen talks in the Summit of 2002, where according 
to their view, Turkey’s objective distance is self evident of its unquestionable non 
Europeanness and therefore its quest of EU membership should be categorically denied. 
Obviousness, common sense and geography should have been enough, at the 
beginning in 1963, to say to Turkey that it was a large country, located 95% in Asia 
Minor, and that it has a vocation to play a major role in its region and to have close 
relations with the EU, but not to become its member. That would not have been 
injurious. Europeans would not have to call upon, forty years later, contestable 
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cultural or religious arguments, to delay the hour of truth. (Hubert Védrine, PS, 
former Minister  for Foreign Affairs, Le Monde , 06/12/2002). 
Therefore, thank to these topographic considerations, the opposition seemed to have found its 
trojan horse in trying to appear “ethically correct” in disapproving Turkey’s EU vocation. 
However, the very same scientific features of geography, which for the opposition 
represented a source of assurance and upon which it consolidated its confidence and strength, 
were instead manipulated by those in favor to confute the validity of the geographical criteria 
as a reliable or even legitimate method of assessment. Indeed, the main counter argument to 
this regard was that geography is by definition a human science, constructed upon human 
decisions over political and historical pressures (Tekin, 2010).  
What challenges us and proves extremely awkward resides in the invocation 
of the geography to justify a refusal, or a hesitation, but with no geographical 
argumentation. […] geography is a frightening and obscure instrument of 
power. (Eric Glon & Patrick Picouet, Le Monde , 31/12/2004). 
Therefore, geography doesn’t “enjoy” the absolute scientific authority of other positive 
sciences. Hence, the assumed objectivity and political neutrality preached by many 
opposition parties was not the case. In other words, geographical criteria were as ambiguous 
and suspicious as any other political argument because of its flexible nature.  
It is a pity […] the limits are not given by nature, but are cultural productions 
rooted in precise historical contexts, to serve particular ends, these limits are 
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likely to be modified and must always be questioned. (Pascal Clerc, Le 
Monde, 19/11/2002). 
Furthermore, it was often claimed that Europeanness was not only about geographic borders 
but also about civilizational features. History and culture could not be left out of the equation 
if we had to discuss about what being European entails and the common values attached to it. 
According to many leading academics and intellectuals, Turkey not only should be 
considered part of Europe - as much as other relatively distant candidates like Cyprus who 
entered the Union in 2004 - but as Jean-Daniel Tordjman (16/12/2002) declared at “Le 
Figaro” journal, it is essential in the construction of European identity, of its culture and 
history.  
History and culture constitute a twin question that goes hand in hand with geographical 
considerations regarding Turkey’s motion to join the European community (Tekin, 2010).  
Geography installs Turkey in Asia for 95% of its territory. And history finds it still 
more foreign in Europe. Two historical currents bathed our continent in turn. The first 
was, after the “ romanité ”, the union in the faith, in “Christianitas”, a union ransacked 
by the wars of religion. The second was the ideal of progress came from the 
Enlightenment, ransacked, in the XXth century, by the war of ideologies. With regard 
to these two currents, Turkey is alien […] the Christian heritage at us is everywhere. 
This universe, you know, is not that of Turkey. The Ottoman heritage is immense, its 
civilization i s prestigious, but it is not ours. (Claude Imbert, Midi-Libre, 
20/12/2004).  
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Therefore, to the essentialist opposition, Turkey was still considered a stranger to the 
European historical and cultural sphere. Turkey did not share most of Europe’s cultural 
heritage which, instead, affiliate the other members of the Union. Such sentiment was to 
some degree co-participated by both sides of the political spectrum, even though it is worth to 
note that among the more moderate parties the real bone of contention was described as “lack 
of common values” rather than simply “cultural differences” (Tekin, 2010).  
What is worth of reflection at this point is that again, European culture and more in general 
European identity is considered to be a static entity, fixed in time and space. Such view is 
further supported by the opposition’s Eurocentric readings of history, which is for them 
represents a form of protection and preservation against threatening exotic influences such as 
Turkey’s. Therefore, civilizational traditions of the former Ottoman Empire are not only 
perceived as distinct and irreconcilable but as a severe threat to Europe’s continuity and well 
being. 
In some cases, most of which coinciding with statements of the far right or sovereignists 
coalitions, indelicate and imprecise religious critiques were advanced further 
instrumentalizing the European identity card to block Turkey’s requests. To this regard, if we 
choose to define European identity primarily by referring to its historical - religious heritage 
then we must comprehend all Semitic religions present in the European landscape throughout 
history. In this case Islam is to be considered as an essential part of Europe’s  identity 
construction even though such roots - that visibly shaped the culture of many Southern 
European countries and especially the Balkans - are often disregarded or addressed by the 
official narratives as exceptional or incidental events which Europe eventually managed to 
contain (Tekin, 2010). This negative connotation, largely endorsed and sponsored by the 
opposition, was firmly rejected by those who, instead, conceived cultural argumentations 
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highly irrelevant - since Turkey was unquestionably part of Europe’s history and an essential 
factor in its civilizational evolution.  
European identity, as well as Islamic identity, are without doubt distinct in their uniqueness. 
However, this doesn’t necessarily imply a clear separation. Neither a genetic divergence or 
inequality between them. As matter of fact, these two entities developed shoulder to shoulder 
with each other. Hence, there is a strong probability that they both have incorporated each 
other’s values and traditions through the years. In conclusion if any identity considerations 
are to be made then, it must be acknowledged that both Selves wouldn’t appear the way we 
understand them today without the direct or indirect influence of the Others. Therefore a 
complete division is not appropriate. A similar verdict was advocated by  Maurice-Ruben 
Hayoun a french philosopher and historian, who correctly assessed in an interview with “Le 
Figaro”: 
After all, if Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Moses Maimonides are rightly 
considered the spiritual fathers of Europe, there is nothing stopping this for status for 
the faithful disciples of Al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes being taken as such since 
they have also contributed to shaping the thinking and feeling of our continent. Why 
not examine with serenity the relationship between the essence of Islam and the 
European identity? (Maurice-Ruben Hayoun, Le Figaro  25/12/2002). 
Functionalist Argumentations. 
The second cluster of argumentations revolves around Turkey’s questionable democratic 
values. Democratic defiances such as its fragile governmental system and scarce human right 
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protection, have been largely used by the opposition to prove Turkey’s ineligibility for EU 
membership. Therefore, in the case of Turkey, the term democracy and the corresponding 
shortages suggested by the opposition’s discourses, imply a broader meaning of it. As a 
matter of fact, the concept of democracy is deployed according to its Western European 
connotation, which as Robert Badinter (2004) claims, goes beyond the simple existence of a 
parliamentary political structure or a genderless comprehensive electoral body. Impendent 
issues, such as the Cyprus dispute, women’s rights and social status, torture and the inhuman 
conditions with which prisoner and refugees are treated, are all undeniable symptoms of 
Turkey’s lack of democratic culture (Tekin, 2010). 
Moreover, it has been observed that most democratic reforms have been pursued in the light 
of a second governmental agenda and in accordance with a hidden well-calculated political 
strategy and not for the sake of democracy or that of fundamental humanitarian values. 
"Democracy is like a train. We shall get out when we arrive at the station we want." (Der 
Spiegel. 30 November 2010)  with this words, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the famous borderline 
dictatorial President of Turkey, founded the Justice and Development party (AKP) in 2003, a 
conservative political party draw from the tradition of moderate Islamism and which 
dominated the political arena for fifteen years. 
To this regard, a highly contested issue, regarding Turkey’s apparent engagement with 
democratic parliamentary political arrangement, concerns the predominant role of the army in 
shaping Turkey’s domestic policy. The numerous military coupe d'état registered through the 
years, particularly the one occurred in 1980 and 1997, including the most recent interventions 
in 2016, were often used by the opponent narratives as evidence of Turkey’s fragile 
democracy. The acknowledgment of the army’s capacity to effectively and dramatically 
change the political arrangements, fed Europe’s suspiciousness and cautiousness in 
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embracing Turkey’s attempts to comply with the EU political standards. As a matter of fact, 
in the public debates, the army is portrayed as the real authority in Turkey’s domestic politics 
which further aggravates the opposition’s allegations regarding its democratic deficiencies.  
Another source of concern for the European public regards the status of women and its 
condition within the Turkish society. Many opposition’s argumentations sustain that, women 
in Turkey are deprived of their basic political rights and are poorly represented by the 
country's institutions especially in the more rural areas where their participation in the 
political life is almost completely absent (Tekin, 2010). In fact, political elites by exploiting 
the occurrence of extreme cases of heavy discrimination and the atrocious episodes of 
violence against women, such as honour crimes and forced marriages, accomplish their goal 
to further estrange Turkey from the European democratic reality.  
Consider especially the women’s rights: as long as Turkey will not give proof of a 
real, effective equality of the man and the woman not only at the University of Ankara 
or among intellectuals, but in the depths of the country, I do not conceive that the 
Union can open adhesion procedures. The equality between women and men is a 
fundamental principle of the Union. (Robert Badinter, PS senator, Le Figaro, 
13/12/2002). 
Moreover, religious and cultural symbols have often been object of political propagandas 
which instrumentalized islamic features such as the headscarf dispute, deployed as one more 
way to prejudicate the uses and customs of of the Islamic Turkish society. Such discussions 
have been largely exasperated by the opposition which has more than often disseminated 
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false accusations leading to misinformation, bigotry and injudicious animosity and 
discrimination.  
A particular aspect regarding the inclusion of Turkey’s democratic qualities into the political 
discourse on Turkey’s EU membership is that, both the supportive and the opposition’s 
parties treat more or less the same problematic elements yet with a complete different attitude 
(Tekin, 2010). Among the more favorable electorates such contingencies are seeing as 
temporary defects due to the necessary reforms assessment process and that, as soon as the 
Europeanization procedures begin, everything will be eventually settled (Akagül & Vaner 
2005:  34). The opposition, on the other hand, firmly believes that such civilizational 
backwardness is impossible to overcome. Turkey will not be able to achieve the democratic 
standards of other EU members, in terms of human rights, rule of law and protections of 
minorities, any time soon. Such deficiencies were considered to be entrenched in Turkey’s 
historical background and therefore inherent to the heritage of its society. Since they never 
participated to the European Enlightenment Revolution, they are unable to understand the 
civic spirit that pervaded Europe (Tekin, 2010).  
A clear instance of such divergence within the political debates on the perception of Turkey’s 
democratic inadequacies, is the case of the Armenian genocide. One of the most emblematic 
questions regarding the life conditions of religious minorities in the Turkish soil. As a matter 
of fact, the high degree of discrimination that Christian minorities, and not only, suffered, 
especially during the twentieth century, represented a critical factor in the determination of 
Turkey’s compliance with the European political criteria required by the Copenhagen 
Agreement. In addition, since 1999, in the post Helsinki period when Turkey’s EU prospects 
were for the first time officially taken into consideration, Turkey’s lack of acknowledgment 
and acceptance of responsibility for the 1915 massacre against the Armenian people 
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represented a heated issue of discussion in Europe. The question of admittance and 
reconciliation with collective memory traumas and historical crimes against humanity 
became central to many political debates in the European arena, to the point that it almost 
became a fixation for many political elites and intellectuals (Demesmay & Fougier 
2005:132).  
Hence, the Armenian catastrophe was considered as a focal aspect in assessing the potential 
European character of Turkey by both political factions, yet in a substantially distinct way 
(Tekin, 2010). From the opposition’s perspective, such atrocity committed by the the Turks 
was reflective of the brutality of their culture and therefore was indicative of the natural 
hostility that the Islamic doctrine inflicted to its disciples. Thus, in this case, historical 
memory was instrumentalized in order to prove Turk’s non Europeanness and contrast with 
the values of their Europeans neighbours. The Armenian genocide served as a historical 
evidence for the demonization of the Turkish Other on civilizational and religious terms 
(ibid).  
On the other side, the more favorable parties used a completely different approach to deal 
with Turkey’s failure in meeting its “devoir de memoire”. In fact, the more turkophile 
factions claimed that such unfortunate episode was still resolvable and that the EU could play 
a leading role in Turkey’s acknowledgment of genocide allegations (Burdy, 2004).  
It is our conviction: Turkey must democratize itself in-depth and take responsibility of 
its past to build a European future. Like you, we are convinced that the entry of 
Turkey into the European Union is synonymous with adhesion to certain values, 
among which are the recognition of the errors of the past for better building the 
future. […] A country which finds its greatness by taking responsibility for its past – 
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in its darkest pages figure the Armenian genocide – as Germany could raise the head 
after the last war by recognizing the Holocaust. (Marie-Arlette Carlotti, Michel 
Rocard, Martine Roure, Strasbourg, 2004). 
By supporting Europe’s patronage and promoting its engagement in the Turkish cause, they 
saw an opportunity of renaissance of the overshadowed international image of Turkey and of 
Islam in general. Europe was depicted as a superior entity, successful in facing its obscure 
history and therefore ready to teach a lesson to the world through the promotion of its 
civilizational values. Despite the absurd degree of self-glorification and arrogance that such 
discourses echoed, this convictions dramatically spread amongst many intellectuals and 
outstanding political figures. 
The memory is a part of civilization. The case of Armenian genocide shows that such 
a dialogue between Europe and the Turkish society is essential and useful for the 
cause of humanity.  (Jean-Dominique Giuliani,  President of the Robert Schumann 
Foundation, Le Figaro , 05/10/2004). 
Pragmatist Argumentations. 
A third constellation of arguments refer to a more pragmatic aspect of Turkey’s potential 
annexation in the EU. The geo-strategic location of Turkey represents a key factor in world’s 
political map. The geo-political assessment of Turkey’s UE membership was largely 
influenced by the country’s conspicuous role during the Cold War, where it acted as a 
moderator in a bipolar system of powers. Back then Europe needed Turkey to protect itself 
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from the Soviet threat which is probably why Turkey felt like claiming EU membership in the 
first place. However, the situation today is different and so are the kind of arguments 
advanced by both sides regarding the strategic consequences of Turkey’s adhesion. 
In any case the main concern around which the political debate revolves is security, yet again 
the ways to achieve it according, to the two parties, dramatically differ from each other. The 
security issue has a dual dimension in the European’s perception and it is significantly linked 
to their understanding of the Union’s project and future. In truth, Turkey is seen an essentially 
Muslim country which awakes old fears and stereotypes associated with its past as  Ottoman 
Empire and in the meantime its cultural and geographical proximity to “the axis of terror” 
such as Iraq, Syria and Iran exacerbates Europe’s anxieties about Islamic terrorism (Tekin, 
2010:145). 
Regarding the first point, while the oppositions insists on the issue of inherent cultural 
differences and the inevitable clash of civilizations, the proponent parties reiterate the 
importance of keeping positive relations with the Islamic neighbours and trying to maintain a 
constant dialogue between Europe and the Muslim world. Interestingly, both sides 
acknowledge an imminent danger for Europe in either promoting or rejecting Turkey’s 
entrance to the EU.  
To say no to Turkey is a dangerous attitude. […] Today after what we have promised, 
to say no to Turkey would be to contribute to rancor, divisions, mass movements 
which would endanger peace and mutual comprehension among the inhabitants of the 
planet. ( Jacques Delors, cited in Burdy 2004:  96). 
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The problematic adjacency of Turkey with pour, unstable and - according to some asinine 
claims of the most extreme right-wing or conservative parties such as the Front National - 
terrorists countries, would transform Europe into a new base for drugs and weapons trade, 
human trafficking and terrorism.  
Turkey in the Union, that will soon mean to say a 100 million Turkish Europeans; no 
more border between our suburbs and Anatolia, from where pour in drugs of Asia, 
Chinese or Pakistani clandestines, networks of Al-Qaida; 90 Turkish deputies in the 
European Parliament against 72 for France. (Alexandre Del Valle, Le Figaro , 
18/12/2002). 
In the contrary, according to the proponents’ point of view, such closeness is rather an asset, 
highly functional to the European international aspirations as the next uncontested global 
superpower. Moreover, amongst the other reasons, Turkey’s geolocation next to some of the 
most prosperous energy sources makes her strategically important for Europe in her attempt 
to find an alternative to the Russian energy provider. 
The second great tension that Europe must consider in priority is about the relations 
between the Occident and the Muslim countries in general. The rejection of Turkey in 
darkness would not be felt as a mistrust and an offence by only Turkey, but in all this 
vast area. Beyond the geo-strategic weight its population (close to 200 million 
inhabitants) and its place on the world map confer that this area, this region is the 
second great oil reserve of the world after the Middle East. We cannot neglect this 
reality. […] Europe has thus an obvious strategic interest to strengthen its bonds with 
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Turkey as much as possible. (Michel Rocard, former Socialist Prime Minister, Le 
Monde , 27/11/2002). 
Besides Turkey’s geopolitical qualities, its population size also raised serious questions about 
the consequences on Europe’s future nature, both in terms of  identity and internal balance of 
power. Such concerns were connected with the general discontent about the recent Eastern 
enlargements, which to some opinions, significantly undermined the growth and prosperity of 
the Union. Regarding Turkey’s case and according to the opposition’s critiques, these would 
cause - not only a significant increase of the the Union’s electorate base, further convoluting 
its decisional process but also - by blending together such culturally different populations, it 
would create an excessively heterogeneous community (Tekin, 2010). Moreover, thank to the 
thoughtful design of the EU voting mechanism, the demographic superiority of Turkey could 
and would provoke major changes to the European internal policy, altering its nature 
permanently. Such risk for most conservative countries was unacceptable as it is manifest in 
Nicolas Sarkozy words: 
Turkey alone represents the equivalent of the entry of the 10 new Eastern 
European countries combined – that’s quite something. Turkey means 71 
million inhabitants – looking ahead to 2050, it will be 100 million, and given 
the new voting rules in the constitution, it would be the country with the most 
votes. (Nicolas Sarkozy, BBC, September 27, 2004). 
On the contrary, from the proponent’s point of view, Turkey’s young and large population 
represented an opportunity for Europe to finally overcome its Achilles heel: the inexorable 
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ageing of the European population, a social malaise which  has been pending for the past 50 
years, decelerating the EU development and integration process, while feeding the emerging 
eurosceptic proclivity. The labor market and the European industries would also benefit by 
such rejuvenation, creating more opportunities for entrepreneurs and putting an end to today’s 
arid and lethargic market.  
Our aging, timid and satisfied continent cannot be content with the present status quo. 
Vis-a-vis the irresistible rise of Asia and the dynamism of the United States, we need 
“fresh blood”, new energies. With its Asian growth rates – nearly 10 percent this year 
– Turkey represents for the “Old” Europe an incentive, a significant contribution. It is 
precisely because Turkey has a large and young population that Europe needs. 
(Dominique Moïsi, political scientist, 17/12/2004). 
Critical Discourse Analysis: Findings and Discussion 
Through the analysis of the political arguments presented in the European debate, it is now 
possible to identify the prevailing logic used to assess the potential consequences of Turkey’s 
eventual EU membership. Such analysis revealed three macro categories within which is 
possible to collocate the different political discourses. These argumentation clusters were 
divided according to their cultural, political or technical scopes. The contrasting views 
advanced within each of these thematic spheres were generally focused on the same critical 
points. Yet the way they were understood, presented and supported were decisively different. 
The analysis presented in the previous chapter, principally based on the explicit discourses 
advanced by politicians and intellectuals which dominated the public debate, represents only 
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the tip of the iceberg. By assessing the several arguments regarding historical differences, 
cultural incompatibilities, democratic deficiencies, geopolitical issues and demographic 
concerns, we have only started scratching the surface of a greater and deeper imbroglio lying 
on the imaginary frontiers of Europe and its latent identity crisis. The choice of arguments 
which accompany the questions on how Turkey’s Eu membership bid should be managed and 
how Europe should be then defined, does itself implicitly determine the boundaries of how 
Europe decides what Europeanness really stands for (Yilmaz, 2005).       10
As Fairclough (2001a) asserts, in order to achieve an adequate discourse analysis regarding a 
defined social issue, it is important to study both its semiotic manifestation and the historical 
context in which such discourse has developed. Therefore, the first step consists in analyzing 
what is said or written. Thus, one must in other words examine the visible facet of the 
problem. The next one is to break down its constitutive elements and reassess them, this time 
taking into consideration the external circumstances that persisted at the time of their 
formation.  
This study tried to summarize some of the most popular linguistic devices, employed to 
construct Turkey’s Other in the European debates within the context of the political 
negotiations on the future relationships of these two entities. However, what eventually 
became clear is that in the realm of European Integration, discussions about Turkey’s 
belonging to the EU encloses a bigger question regarding the essence of European identity 
itself. Therefore, the international relations issue on Turkey’s Europeanness necessarily 
acquires a significant identity dimension (Tekin, 2010). As it was assessed in the beginning of 
the present inquiry, The Self/Other dichotomy is crucial in the construction of identity. In the 
 Yılmaz, Hakan. 2005. “Introduction: Placing Turkey on the map of Europe.” In Placing Turkey on the map of 10
Europe , Hakan Yılmaz (ed.), 1–22. Istanbul: Bogazici University Press.
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case at  hand, Turkey’s alterity and the socio-historical construction of its otherness play a 
fundamental role in the making of a collective European Identity. Hence, it is correct to assert 
that Turkey in this occasion is addressed as the “constitutive Other”of Europe.  
Yet the political and historical context, within which such constructive strategy was used and 
framed by the main political discourses, is also vital in ones understanding of the Turkey-EU 
dilemma. What is clear from the several speeches examined here is that, the EU is primarily 
perceived in its cultural and geographical dimension rather than as an abstract supranational 
political entity or a merely advantageous economic agreement (Hülsse, 2000:18). Thus, again 
the disputes about Turkey’s potential EU membership essentially revolve around the degree 
of Europeanness of  its society (ibid).  
A major semantic strategy, largely used when discussing Turkey’s belonging or non-
belonging to Europe, consists in the creation of an ingroup homogeneity (Wodak, 2007). The 
aim of such practice is to create and disseminate a sense of unity and sameness among the 
state members which will eventually become the basis for the construction of a shared 
identity. In the example of the EU, such aura of fraternization  - perceived more on cultural 
and historical grounds and shared religion and traditions - clearly represents, not only its 
sealing wax but also its symbol of distinction from other collectives. In such a scenario, 
Turkey is necessarily depicted as the out-group and the distant Other, for the sake of EU’s 
identity formation (Wodak, 2001). What I find remarkable in the political discourse about EU 
identity is that, in defining her features and commonalities, she seems to be more worried in 
emphasizing what separates her from the “others” rather what holds her together (Delanty, 
1995:5). In fact, hardly ever is it mentioned in the speeches about Europeanness and common 
values, the political and institutional or economic differences within the Union itself. Nor the 
numerous wars that afflicted the European journey towards integration, which represented 
!46
some of the deadliest and most atrocious episodes in human history. On the contrary the 
perpetual sanctification of the in-group and its bias Self-identification with glorious cultural 
and civilizational values, while obscuring or even ignoring the qualities of the out-group, is 
part of an overall strategy aimed to establish boundaries between groups by prejudicing the 
“other” (Van Dijk 2000c:  81). 
 The extensive use of positive lexication in the representation of Europe undoubtedly implies 
the superiority of its own identity, constructed upon democracy, scientific progress and 
human rights. According to such view, the EU is the direct product of its members and 
therefore it is crucial to make sure that only qualified candidates can be accepted in for the 
sake of the Union’s virtue and international reputation. But what feature should a candidate 
boast then in order to be considered “euro-qualified”? This is still not clear due to the fluid 
nature of the EU and its ever evolving identity. For now what seems to be an important 
criteria of selection is the degree of dissimilarity or distance of its perceived image from 
Europe’s others: “as long as you are not like Them you can be with Us”. 
The perpetual demonization of the Other is a popular strategy in the political discourse of the 
EU. Aware of the internal discrepancies threatening the balance and the well being of such 
fragile union, the dialectical stigmatization of the Turkish Other coupled with the perennial 
contrast between “Us” and “Them”, is a clear attempt to overcome such lack of unity and to 
drive the attention away from a questionable internal homogeneity. As Therbon (1995:37) 
asserts, identity is perceived of and understood in connection with its others, this implies the 
supremacy of the “otherness” of the out-groups over the “sameness” of the in-group itself 
when defining its nature. Therefore, the negative predication of the Turkish Other, in this 
case, is functional to the consolidation of the European Self. To put it on Delanty’s words 
(1995:5): “Identities are always relational and what matters is not the representation of the 
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Other as such but the actual nature of the difference that is constructed”, hence, what defines 
Europeanness “is not what its members have in common but in what separates them from the 
others”. 
Conclusion  
Since the 1990s the EU has been subjected to a gradual yet constant enlargement which has 
further aggravated its growing identity crisis. In the constitutional Treaty of Rome it is stated 
that “any European country is eligible for membership to the EU” (European Neighbourhood 
Policy And Enlargement Negotiations, 2017),  however, it does not define what being 11
“European” means (Llobera, 2001: 179). While many intellectuals would argue that the lack 
of an official provision reflects the precariousness of the Union, I instead believe that this is 
an indicator of the bright and farsighted vision of the EU project by its founding fathers. As 
Hall (1992) argues in his brilliant manuscript, collective identities are fluid, flexible, 
numerous, actual, syncretic and constructed. Therefore, their continuous transformation is 
unavoidable and a printed norm that limits such a process would be meaningless and 
impractical if not counterproductive. Moreover, with ongoing globalization and the 
communication revolution, if a definition of European identity had to be established, this 
would have much more to do with the presence of minorities in Europe, rather than the 
traditional cultural or religious fixations that most conservative doctrines ferociously defend 
in today’s debates.  
In conclusion, the major finding of this research is that European collective identity, as well 
as their constitutional elements - such as the “Turkish Other” - are subject to perpetual 
transformations and therefore  are  adjusted accordingly over time. Such an assertion implies 
 “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them 11
may apply to become a member of the Union” TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION.TITLE VI - FINAL 
PROVISIONS - Article 49 (ex Article 49 TEU).
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that, since International Relations and more specifically national foreign policies largely 
depend on a constructed social imagination - which determines whether the Other, in this 
case Turkey, is considered a friend or foe of the Self - they are destined to be reflective of the 
relevant trends and political discussions responsible for the formation of social images. 
The fact that the European political discourse regarding Turkey’s EU membership bid is 
visibly dominated by the opposition’s voices, shows how the fear of losing control over the 
European integration process, challenged by the recent humanitarian crisis and global 
transformations, prevails over the positive ideals of solidarity and democratic prosperity. The 
political choice to deny the acceptance of Turkey into the European family - and more 
generally to reject any further contact with the Islamic world on cultural and civilizational 
grounds - is just one of the symptoms of EU’s internal identity crisis. Indeed, the imperative 
necessity felt by the European public to draw the cultural and civilizational borders of Europe 
in order to differentiate themselves from the dangerous Other, is a clear sign of collective 
uncertainty and anxiety. In this regard, it is my opinion that the political trend of demonizing 
the Turkish Other provides a catalyst for the positive Self-representation scheme aimed at 
alleviating the European public’s current malaise. The incumbent identity crisis that the EU 
has continually ignored, for the purpose of self preservation and the continuity of its 
pioneering integration project, provides the wider context from which this issue takes its 
form. 
The theoretical relevance of the present study could be further appreciated if collocated 
within the broader social plague in today’s international realm. The detrimental relationship 
between the Occident and Orient which significantly exacerbates today’s global crisis cannot 
be explored and explained on one level or from a single point of view. Indeed, while it is my 
personal choice to prefer the adoption of a more historical and social approach, I am aware 
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that other indexes related to economic, legal and sustainability aspects are vital for the 
analytical relevance of the study.  
Moreover, for the sake of intellectual honesty, the findings and conclusions of the present 
inquiry may not be considered definitive. For this same reason any verdict cannot rely  solely 
on one side’s perspective. Turkey’s voice must be included in the discussion. Therefore, a 
natural development of this research should include a parallel investigation on Turkey’s 
perception of Europe, and how this has affected Turkey’s attitudes towards the EU during the 
negotiation process.  
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